trade deficit, inbihit technological progress or threaten national security, Defenders of foreign direct investment stress the increased economic activity stemming from new jobs and the transfer to the United States of improved manage' ment, marketing and production techniques. This paper examines three aspects of foreign direct investment in the United States (FDIUS) to assess whether foreign-owned companies are more likely to have malign or benign effects on the U.S. economy. First, the paper highlights the basic facts about FDIUS-its amount, the home countries of the foreign-owned companies, its distribution across industries and the relative share of the US. economy controlled by foreign~: 77~y~_ Foreign direct investment (ED!) is the put'chase of ownership in, or the flow of lending to, an enterprise located in a foreign country that is largely owned by residents of the investing country. FDILJS results in a foreign enterprise operating in the United States under the control of a firm (or individuals) of a country other than the tjnited States, Thus, ED! is ownership with actual control of the enterprise, which is what distinguishes ED! from portfolio investment. 2
The official definition of FDIUS used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis requires the investing Firm to have a minimum of 10 percent ownership of the enterprise in the United Unfortunately, the use of historical cost ignores the effects of both real and nominal changes in the value of the investment. For example, changes in the earnings prospects of a foreign-owned firm in the United States can change the value of a specific investment, and changes in the overall price level can affect the value of ED! generally. These drawbacks prompted the development of two other measures of FDI. The first, called current cost, re-values investment using estimates of the current value of the net stock of direct investment capital, land and inventories, A second, more general measure is the market value of a firm's net worth, This measure implicitly values both tangible and intangible assets, such as patents and trademarks, because a firm's net worth is the difference between its assets and liabilities,
The current cost and market value measures, also shown in figure 1, reveal two facts. First, like the book value measure, both have grown rapidly in recent years and, second, both differ from the book value of FDIUS. Between 1982 and , the current cost value of FDIUS increased from 5173,2 billion to $465.9 billion, an annual growth rate of 13,2 percent, while the market value measure increased from $133.0 billion to $530.4 billion, an annual growth rate of 18.9 percent. These different growth rates have resulted in a book value of FDIUS for 1990 that is 87 percent of the current cost value and 76 percent of the market value.
By themselves, these levels of FD!US are not especially revealing. One way to provide perspective is to examine the counterpart of EDIUS, the levels of FDI held by U.S. firms. Not only is the United States the leading host country in the world for ED!, it is also the leading source country. Despite the rapid growth of FD!US, FDI held by US. firms as of 1990 exceeds FDIUS, irrespective of the method of measurement. For example, EDI held by U.S. firms in 1990 was $421.5 billion using the book value, $598.1 billion using current cost value and $714.1 billion using the market value, Thus, FDI held by U.S. firms exceeded FDIUS by $17.8 billion, $132.2 billion or $183.7 billion, respectively.
A second way to provide perspective is to calculate the ratio of FDIUS to the total net worth of U.S non-financial corporations (using the book value of each). Between 1977 and 1990, according to Graham and Krugman (1991) , this ratio increased from 2.1 percent to 10.5 percent. This suggests "foreign control" of about 10 percent of the US. economy. 5
Another way to assess the extent of foreign control is to examine the share of U.S. workers employed by foreign-owned firms. Between 1977 and 1988 , employment at non-bank foreign.affiliated firms rose from 1.7 percent to 4.3 percent of all U.S. non-bank employment.°W hen one focuses only on the manufacturing sector, the share rises from 3.5 percent to 8.9 percent.
No matter which measure is used, foreign ownership and control have increased substantially in recent years.' The level of foreign control, however, is not as high as it is in most other developed countries, For example, according to Julius and Thomsen (1988) , the share of foreign-owned firms' manufacturing employment in 1986 was 7 percent in the United States, 21 percent in France, 13 percent in Germany, 14 percent in the United Kingdom and 1 percent in Japan. Except for Japan, the rapid increase in FDIUS has made the level of foreign control in the United States closer to that of other developed countries.
EDIUS occurs in either of two ways. One way, termed "greenfield" investment, involves the construction of new production facilities in the United States-either brand new subsidiaries or expansions of existing subsidiaries, The other method of FDIUS is the acquisition of existing U.S. firms. Despite some greenfield investments 5 There are problems with such an assessment. First, both the numerator and the denominator are measured according to book value, A better measure would use market values. Since the market value of FDIUS exceeds the book value, the numerator would clearly increase. To determine how the ratio would change, the market value of U.S. nonfinancial corporations is required. This might produce a reduction in the ratio, Another problem is that this ratio does not measure the extent to which these claims are leveraged through less than 100 percent ownership and borrowing from unrelated parties into control over a larger amount of assets. For example, a foreign investor with 80 percent ownership of a company with $100 million in assets controls $100 million in assets, but the measure of FDIUS indicates control of only $80 million (80 percent of $100 million), that have generated much publicity, such as the opening of Japanese.owned automobile plants, FD!US has occurred primarily by way of acquisitions. Table 1 shows the relative dominance of acquisitions from 1980 to 1990. For example, the $56.8 billion outlay in 1990 by foreign firms to acquire existing firms was more than seven times larger than the $7.7 billion outlay to establish new subsidiaries.
/Ẽ DIUS occurs in various industries and involves numerous, primarily developed, foreign countries. As figure 2 shows, the United Kingdom, whose share of EDIUS was 26.8 percent in 1990, is the leading source country. The other leading investors and their shares in 1990 are: Japan-20.7 percent; the Netherlands-15,9 percent; Germany-6.9 percent; and Canada-6.9 percent. Despite having a smaller share than the British, Japanese FDIUS has generated much more publicity than British EDIUS. Part of the reason for this attention is due to the industries in which the Japanese are involved, of which more is said later, and part is due to the rapid rise of Japanese FD!US in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990, Japanese FDIUS increased at an annual rate of 33.3 percent, boosting the Japanese share from 5.7 percent to 20.7 percent. Table 2 shows that the largest share of FDIUS remains in manufacturing. Between 1980 and 1990, investment in this sector increased nearly fivefold. Since total EDIUS increased similarly, the manufacturing share of F'DIUS was slightly less than 40 percent in both 1980 and 1990. The United Kingdom is the leading foreign investor in manufacturing by a wide margin. In 1990, its share was 33.1 percent, more than double the Netherlands' 15.3 percent. The other leading investors are: Germany-9.5 percent; Japan-9.5 percent; and Canada-5.8 percent. The largest portion (26 percent) of manufacturing EDIUS in 1990 was in chemicals, followed by machinery (18.5 percent), food processing (14.3 percent) and primary and fabricated metals (11 percent).
The wholesale and retail trade sector has the second-largest share of FD!US. Its share was 15.4 percent in 1990, down from 18.3 percent in 1980. These shares, however, are likely overstated because of the method used to allocate industry statistics: wholesale trade in automobiles includes some manufacturing of automobiles. As automobile production by Japanese-owned affiliates increases, sales of automobiles manufactured in the United States will rise relative to the sales of automobiles imported from Japan for resale. As this occurs, more affiliates will be reclassified from wholesale trade into manufacturing, causing reported FD!US in transportation equipment manufacturing to rise and FD!US in wholesale trade to fall.
Finance and insurance accounted for 9.7 percent of FDIUS in 1990, up from 8.9 percent in 1980. Countries with major financial markets-Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada and the United Kingdom-account for the majority of this investment.
The share of FDIUS in petroleum, the fourthleading industry, declined from 14.7 percent in 1980 to 9.4 percent in 1990. According to Rutter (1991) , there were fewer acquisitions in petroleum than in most other industries during the decade. In fact, both foreign and domestic investment in the petroleum industry grew relatively slowly during the 1980s.
The remaining industries, real estate and banking, are probably the most controversial. The share of FD!US in real estate increased tions, such as Hawaii, downtown Los Angeles from 7.3 percent in 1980 to 8.6 percent in 1990.
and Houston and a few other urban areas. The $34.6 billion of real estate FDIUS reflects Some foreign ownership may also go unreportthe investment of foreign parents in U.S. affili-ed; however, Graham and Krugman (1991) conates whose major activity is real estate, Large dude its importance is likely to be small. A final amounts of U.S. real estate are also held by af-cause of controversy is the large share of filiates classified in other industries. Thus, the Japanese ownership.ã ctual level of real estate FD!US exceeds $34.6 -. , ,
The Japanese also play a prominent role in billion. In addition, the value of assets actually the FDIUS that has occurred in banking. Becontrolled by foreign owners is likely much tween 1980 and 1990, the share of FDIUS in greater because of the high debt leverage in -.
. .
banking declined from 5.5 percent to 4.7 perthis industry (foreign investors are able to con--cent; however, foreign ownership in the U.S. trol real estate valued far greater than their .. banking industry is large and has been increasown equity by borrowing from unrelated ing. In 1980, 11.9 percent of the total assets of parties).
. all U.S. banks were held by financial affiliates of Some of the controversy surrounding this in-foreign banks and holding companies. By 1990, vestment is because foreign ownership of real this figure had risen to 21.2 percent, more than estate tends to be concentrated in a few loca-half of which is held by Japanese-owned banks.°T heU.S-Japanese controversy encompasses much more Much research has been devoted to developing theoretical explanations of FDI. 'I'he importance of specific factors that might explain FDIUS has also been examined thoroughly. Rather than provide an in-depth review of this voluminous literature, let's examine the primary explanation of FDI, which is based on the "industrial-organization" approach, and the commonly identified determinants of FDI, It is important to stress that this explanation is most useful in discussing FDI in manufacturing. ////.r.:r/p.//&~~,,
Standard FDI theories rely on "firm-specific advantages" to explain why it occurs,'°The foreign investor must have some advantage over local firms to compensate for the fact that the multinational corporation (MNC) incurs additional costs because of 1) cultural, legal, institutional and linguistic differences; 2) a lack of knowledge about local market conditions; and 3) lengthier lines of communication and, therefore, an increase in communication failures.
A foreign investor's advantages can take many forms. Technology is the primary advantage; access to large amounts of capital, superior management and products differentiated by successful advertising are also important.
A foreign company's advantages are exploited by FDJ only if, given its information and expectations about prices, costs and legal environment, it can earn higher profits. Any technological advantage, defined broadly as economically valuable knowledge, can be exploited by exports to a country instead of foreign production and sales in that same country. Thus, the firm selects FDJ over exporting only if the former is more profitable. FDI and exporting, however, are not the only alternatives. A firm with a technological advantage may license a firm in another country to produce a good using its technology." Once again, the firm with the technological advantage will choose the route with the highest anticipated profits.
Firm-specific advantages have led scholars to develop theories of FDI in which the MNC has some unique market power.
12 Two variants of the so-called industrial-organization approach, one most closely associated with Hymer (1976) and the other with Magee (1977) , demonstrate this approach.
in Hymer's view, because a foreign direct investor is one of a small number of producers of a specific good, the firm can affect the price of the good by altering its production. By decreasing its production, the firm can force the market price higher and vice versa. The MNC, according to Hymer, uses FDI strategically to limit competition and protect its market power. Thus, the MNC engages in FDI to beat its competitors into a particular foreign market.
10 An alternative theory explains FDI by requiring that foreign majority of worldwide FDI, often occurs in both directions, firms have access to capital at a lower cost than domestic raise doubts about the cost of capital explanation.
firms. As Graham and Krugman (1991) point out, this ap-ilFor an elementary discussion of the choice among FDI, exproach is sublect to serious criticisms, First, foreign inves-porting and licensing by firms in the beer brewing industry, tors with relatively lower capital costs can achieve higher see Karrenbrock (1990) . returns by portfolio investments as well as by FDI. Therefore, this approach does not differentiate among various 125ee Cantwell (1991) and Graham and Krugman (1991) , aptypes of investment. In addition, the facts that, first, FDI is pendix B, for summaries of industrial-organization explanafrequently financed by funds provided by the host country tions of FDI. and, second, FDI among developed countries, which is the Some concerns have been raised about FDI in this context because of fears that the foreign investor, as part of the firm's commitment to investment, will extract promises from the host government to limit imports from other competitors or prevent EDI by other competitors. If this were to happen, there would be little competition in the host country for the foreign investor, Consumers would ultimately pay higher prices than they would in the absence of trade or investment restrictions. in Magee's view, which is known as the appropriability theory, the firm-specific advantages that stimulate FDI do not reduce competition in product markets. Even though firm-specific advantages allow the MNC to generate profits, they do not imply that the firm will necessarily have market power in product markets. Rather, FDI allows the benefits of technology to spread.
EDI is necessary for the firm to "appropriate" the potential gains from its technology. Generally speaking, the reasons to favor FDT over the explicit sale of the advantage to outsiders revolve around the difficulties involved in market transactions. In some cases, the technology involved in an activity, such as running a factory, is spread among members of a group. Since the knowledge is not easily summarized or communicated, it is hard to package and sell. Such a market transfer is complicated further because it is difficult for a potential buyer to decide how much the knowledge is worth. If the buyer had sufficient information to value the knowledge, he would likely know as much as the seller and, thus, have no reason to buy the "technology."
The appropriabilitv theory, therefore, stresses the importance of the transfer of technology from one country to another within an MNC, Restrictions on FDI limit the transfer of the firm-specific advantages of MNCs. Since these advantages contribute to rising productivity and incomes, restrictions on FDI flows into a country can harm that country's economic performance.
The rapid rise of FDIUS since the late 1970s has prompted much research that attempts to isolate specific factors that explain it. Since FDI theory sti-esses the importance of technological differences, the role of technology in the rapid growth of FDIUS is examined first, The effects of exchange rate changes, taxation, protectionist pressures and the business cycle on I l)lU~iill' then explored.
'rhe preceding views of FDI stress the importance of the transfer of technology from a parent to its foreign affiliate, MNCs, however, can also transfer technology from the affiliate to the parent. Rapid increases in foreign direct investment in the United States during the 1980s have worried some observers that foreign firms are investing primarily to acquire US. technology, which could harm the competitive position of U.S. firms.
One way to assess international transfers of technology involving U.S. affiliates of foreignbased MNCs is to compare receipts of royalties and license fees from their foreign parents with payments of such fees to their foreign parents. Receipts measure the value of technology transferred from foreign-owned companies in the United States to their parents, while payments measure purchases of technology from their parents. According to table 3, both measures have increased at annual rates of more than 20 percent since 1982, Payments by US, affiliates, however, far exceed receipts in each year and were nearly six times the value of receipts in 1990, Thus, technology transfers are occurring to a far greater extent from foreign-based MNCs to their American affiliates than the reverse.
While the preceding evidence is consistent with FDI theory, it still does not explain why FDIUS has risen faster than FDI by US, firms. Once again, the role of technology in FDI theon' provides insights. One explanation revolves around the shrinking and, in some cases, reversal of U.S. technological superiority. Generally speaking, from the end of World War H until 1970, U.S-based firms had substantial advantages over foreign-based firms in technology and management skills, 'these advantages caused FDI abroad by V.5.-based firms to exceed FDIUS. Over the last 20 years, however, foreign-based firms have developed such advantages of their own to a far greater extent than they had previously; these advantages have provided a stimulus to FDIUS." Thus, the increasing role of foreign firms in US. pt'oduction can be related to changing patterns of the development of new technology and management innovations throughout the world." c / While a pre-eminent role in explaining FDIUS can be ascribed to technology, other factors can affect FDIUS. One common argument is that a "weak" foreign exchange value of the dollar encourages EDIUS, In many discussions, a weak dollar is not defined formally, hut is used informally as a value lower than its value at some previous point. The lower value of the dollar has two effects that could stiniulate FDIUS, First, it deters exports to the United States as U.S. consumers are faced with higher prices. 'therefore, foreign firms might find it more attractive to locate production in the United States rather than export a smaller quantity. Second, the lower value of the dollar-makes U.S. pi-oductive assets cheaper for foreign firms than they were previously.
While a weak dollar makes production in the United States more attractive, all other things the same, it is crucial to emphasize that FDIUS depends on whether the U.S. productive assets are worth more to a foreign-based firm than to a U.S-based firm, A declining dollar raises the expected returns to both a US, owner and a foreign owner. How might the expected returns rise more for the latter than the former?
One argument focuses on the changing cornposition of production in the United States, As the dollar declines, U.S. competitiveness shifts from non-traded sectors, such as services and retail trade, to traded sectors, such as manufacturing. Since FDI is more substantial in traded than non-traded sectors, production in the United States shifts from areas in which foreignowned companies have little involvement to areas in which they have much more involvement,' 5 ft is unclear exactly what impact changes in the foreign exchange value of the dollar have on FDIUS.'°What is clear is that the long-run upward trend in FDIUS beginning in the late 1970s took place during a strengthening as well as a weakening of the dollar, Thus, the evidence suggests that changes in the value of the dollar are, at most, a factor that has had slight effects, 4 ,
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Changes in tax policy have also been viewed as a potential determinant of FDIUS, Two major changes in U.S. tax policy in 1981 and 1986 may have contributed to the timing of changes in the rate of FDIUS. To assess the impact US, tax changes on FDIUS, such changes must be viewed in conjunction with the tax systems of the source countries.
Generally speaking, two types of tax systems can he identified in the leading source countries for FDIUS. Countries with "territorial" corporate taxation, like the Netherlands and Canada, do 13 Kudrle (1991) notes that four recent books on FDIUS agree that the share of advantages held by firms based outside the United States has grown substantially relative to U.S.based firms in recent years. See Chandler (1986) for a history of MNCs and global competition. " Ray (1991) provides evidence that superior management underlies many acquisitions, while technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have stimulated greenfield investments. 1~A related argument by Froot and Stein (1989) highlights the mole of relative wealth effects, A declining dollar raises the value of foreign firms compared with U.S. firms. If firms are limited in their borrowing capacity by their debt-equity ratios, the declining dollar raises the purchasing power of foreign firms. This may allow a foreign firm to outbid a U.S. firm in an attempt to acquire assets in the United States. "Identifying the impact of exchange rate changes is complicated by the necessity of distinguishing between temporary and permanent changes. If an exchange rate change is viewed as temporary, a firm's choice between exporting and FDI is unlikely to be affected. Countries with "worldwide" systems, like the United Kingdom and Japan, tax the earnings of subsidiaries while granting a tax credit for taxes paid to host-country governments. For example, under a worldwide system, subsidiaries of foreign firms pay corporate profit taxes similar to those paid by domestic firms, When they repatriate income to their parent, the income is subject to taxation at the home-country rate, with a credit for taxes paid to the US. government.
The differing tax systems provide different investment incentives for given U,S, tax changes.
In the early 1980s, U.S. corporate taxes were reduced by accelerated depreciation allowances,'~B)' allowing firms to reduce theiitaxable incomes, these cuts were valuable to US-owned corporations. The cuts should also have been valuable to foreign firms, though they were more valuable to those subject to territorial rather than worldwide taxation, Firms subject to worldwide taxation faced the offsetting effects of reduced tax credits.
Overall, the tax cuts provided relatively more benefits to US-owned firms than foreign-owned firms and, thus, were biased against F'DLUS, In addition, the bias against firms from the United Kingdom and Japan, countries with worldwide systems, was greater than against firms from the Netherlands and Canada, countries with territorial systems, These incentives were reduced in 1986 when tax legislation eliminated the special investment incentive.s.
Generally speaking, little empirical evidence suggests that tax rate changes have played a major role in FD1US. The share of FIJIUS from the Netherlands and Canada relative to Japan and the United Kingdom did not rise from 1981 to 1986 and fall thereafter, Slemrod (1990) also fails to find that tax changes affect FUIUS.
There is, however, some empirical evidence that changes in taxes matter, The preceding argument suggested that US. tax cuts deterred FDIUS, while tax increases encouraged FIJIUS. Extending this argument across industries, FD1US should be higher in industries subject to higher tax rates on capital. In fact, Swensen (1990) has found such a positive association; Klein and Hosengren (1991) , on the other hand, found no such association. In addition, Auerbach and Hassett (1991) found no evidence that the 1986 tax changes have influenced FDIUS. overall, the empirical evidence points, at most, to a very small role for tax policy in affecting FD1US.
Another' factor identified as a potential determinant of FDTUS is actual or potential protectionist measures, The basic idea is that a trade harrier, or the threat of imposing one, will induce FI]IUS because the profitability of production in the United States by the foreign-oxvned firm would rise relative to exporting to the United States. Underlying such behavior, of course, is some advantage possessed by the foreign-owned firm.
The fact that trade barriers are frequently thought of as protecting US-owned firms is ironic. In fact, such protection tends to increase foreign control in the US. economy. A domestic industry demanding protection is likely to he one in which foreign firms have special advantages. 'i'rade barriers erected in that industry simply attract F'DILJS, stimulating additional foreign-owned production.
Protectionism has played a role in F'DIUS." The production of automobiles and color television sets are two examples." Nonetheless, protectionism is not likely to have become so large a factor that it can explain the rapid increase in FD1US, '~Adepreciation allowance reflects the reduction in the value of assets arising from their use in producing goods and services.
For tax purposes, these allowances reduce net profit and, therefore, taxes. An acceleration of these allowances means that larger reductions in the values of assets are recognized earlier in their productive lives, "See Ray (1991) for empirical evidence that the desire to circumvent trade restrictions has motivated FDIUS.
"See Graham and Krugman (1991) for brief case studies of production in the United States of both automobiles and color television sets. The authors state that by the mid-1970s Japanese producers of color television sets had developed better designs and production systems than U.S. producers. As a result, Japanese producers were able to produce higher quality sets at lower prices than US. producers. U.S. producers sought and received protection from their foreign competitors in the form of a ceiling on the quantity of color television sets exported to the United States. To evade the export limitation, Japanese firms simply established production facilities in the United States and used their advantages to outperform their U.S. competitors. Thus, in this industry, the voluntary export restraint stimulated FDIUS,
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A final factor affecting FDIUS is the business cycle. The business cycle characterizes the extent to which the level of economic activity in the United States and abroad changes over time, Julius (1991) , in a study of inflows into France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States found that FDI rose faster than output during economic recoveries and fell faster during recessions, 2°C hanges in economic activity, however, are not likely to affect the relative shares of foreign-vs. U.S--controlled production substantially because the business cycle affects the profit expectations of foreign and domestic investors similarly.
The major controversies about the effects of FDIUS encompass economic as well as political issues," In addition, there are national security issues that involve economic and political considerations. This paper, however, examines the issues that are primarily economic,"
FDI facilitates the movement across national borders of goods, services and, most important, technology by reducing some transaction costs that inhibit trade, For example, reaching an agreement to transfer technology within a MNC is much easier (that is, less costly) than it is with two separate companies.
The benefits of the trade stimulated by the expansion of MNCs come from three sources.
The first source is known as comparative advantage. Countries have different combinations of productive resources, and goods are produced with different combinations of these resources, Trade allows countries to benefit by ptoducing goods that, relative to other countries, they can produce and sell cheaply and exchanging them for goods that can be produced and sold more cheaply abroad, The second source of gains from trade requires increasing returns to scale, With trade, countries can produce a narrower range and larger quantities of goods than they could otherwise, Longer production runs may allow firms to achieve lower per unit production costs. Finally, trade reduces the power of firms to set prices (that is, increases competition) and allows consumers to enjoy larger quantities and lower prices.
Looking specifically at trade in technology, FDI allows a firm to appropriate (or capture) the benefits of its own research and development. When the foreign investor produces goods and services using its own technology, it is as if there were trade in the results of research and development. From the firm's point of view, its appropriation of benefits provides the incentive to engage in research and development in the first place. The data in table  3 illustrates the importance of trade in technology. Recall that, for 1990, the value of technology transferred from foreign parents to U.S. affiliates was nearly six times that transferred from U.S. affiliates to their foreign parents.
Proponents of FDI frequently stress the generation of what are termed "external benefits." Foreign firms may not be able to appropriate all of the gains from the technology they transfer. Instead, domestic firms can learn and imitate the transferred technology and management methods, and workers may take their acquired skills and use them in other jobs, Unfortunately, these external benefits are difficult to measure.
On the other hand, critics argue that FDIUS tends to reduce the spillover of external benefits, particularly those associated with engaging in research and development. Research and development involves many complex intellectual activities undertaken by highly skilled employees, Critics suggest that these activities tend to be located near the headquarters of the parent firm. Since the headquarters of foreignowned firms are located outside the United States, some are concerned that research and development activities might be shifted out of the United States, For example, as more of the '°Similarly, Ray (1991) found that FDIUS is associated with large and growing product markets in an expanding economy. "Analyses of the impact of FDIUS on the U.S. economy have been hampered because of data problems. The Foreign Direct Investment and International Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990 authorizes different agencies of the US. government to exchange confidential information to improve the quality of data, some of which is to be published during summer 1992. See Moczar (1991) for details. "See Graham and Krugman (1991) for an overview of both the political and national security issues associated with FDIUS. One concern is that foreign-owned firms might bias U.S. political decisions toward their interests. Choate (1990) argues that Japanese firms have an undue influence on U.S. public policy. Without question, the most controversy about FDIUS concerns employment. Advocates of FD1LIS suggest that the rising number of US. employees in foreign-owned firms rept-esents the creation of new jobs, Critics stress that FDIUS is a dynamic process, which may or may not create jobs. While critics concede that new plants and expansions of existing plants lead to the creation of new jobs, they reject the general presumption that acquisitions create new jobs. For acquisitions to create jobs, one would have to argue that, without the foreign purchase, the jobs in the acquired firm would have been eliminated and no other US, firm would have expanded following the closing of an acquired t'irm. Such an argument strains credibility, A more realistic view is that acquisitions have little effect on jobs and primarily reflect the transfer of jobs from US, to foreign owner's," Graham and Krugman (1991) argue that the focus on job creation reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how the US, macroeconomy functions, The supply of labor is the key de-" Glickman and Woodward (1989) stress that the lob creation effects of FDIUS have been "much less than meets the eye1 More important than the number of jobs associated with FIJIUS is the types of jobs.'~This issue is frequently described as "good" jobs are being replaced by "bad" jobs. One argument is that foreign-based firms prefer to engage in high-wage activities at home, while engaging in low-wage activities in the United States. Some contrary evidence has already been presented.
For example, there is no evidence that foreignbased firms perform research and development in the United States, a high-wage activity, to a lesser degree than U.S. firms do.
Another way to examine job quality is to compare the wages of workers employed by foreign owners with those of U.S. owners. Table 5 indicates that compensation per worker in U,S, affiliates of foreign firms is comparable to that in U.S. firms. For all industries, pay by U.S. affiliã tes of foreign firms was $29,800 in 1987, substantially more than the $24,200 paid by U.S. firms, This difference, however, is primarily because the distribution of FDIUS tends to be more pronounced in higher-paying industries than US, investment generally.
Looking at specific industries, there is little difference in compensation per worker between the two sets of firms, except in petroleum and finance, insurance and real estate. For example, workers employed by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms in the primary and fabricated metals ' 4 fleich (1991) argues that a nation's standard of living is increasingly dependent on the value of the skills and insights that its workers contribute to the world economy-Since workers learn by doing, a foreign-owned firm that hires Americans to either solve or identify complex problems helps the U.S. standard of living to a greater degree than a US-owned firm that contracts with foreign workers to do the same. In such an environment, the key to well-being is to increase the skill levels of workers, Closely related is the fact that FDIUS might be displacing imports. In other words, the produc-25 Graham and Krugman (1991) argue that using all industries rather than manufacturing only overstates the differences between U.S-based MNCs and U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. These numbers, which show that U,S. affiliates of foreign firms both export and import more per worker ($18,090 vs. $12,010 and $40,460 vs. $10,010, respectively), are misleading because some foreign-owned firms are primarily trading branches, For example, the trading operations of Japanese automobile firms are foreign-owned and, as a result, have a large effect on the import numbers.
' 6
The accuracy of imports per worker by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms is important for assessing the profitability of FDIUS, Lawrence (1990) and others have noted that FDIUS has not been especially profitable, For example, the ratio of income to equity for FDIUS in manufacturing in 1987 was 5.9 percent, less than half the 12.8 percent return in US. manufacturing. One explanation is that foreign-owned companies under-report their U.S. earnings by overstating the cost of imports purchased from their parents, If undertaken, this practice, termed transfer pricing, shifts profits and tax revenue from the United States to foreign countries. An alternative explanation, supported empirically in a study released by the Organization for International Investment (1992) , stresses the rapid growth of FDIUS relative to investment by other corporations. The rapid growth of FDIUS has caused foreign-owned companies to incur substantial start-up costs and large expenses for interest and depreciation, causing their net income and pre-tax rates of return to fall below that of corporations in general. tion associated with FDIUS could reduce imports. For example, prior to Japanese automobile production in the United States, purchases of Japanese automobiles were entirely imports. Now, even though the typical Japanese automobile produced in the United States might have less U.S. content than the typical U.S. automobile produced in the United States, the fact that some portion of the Japanese automobile is produced in the United States means less imports than previously.
Employment and Foreign
Finally, it is important to note that the trading behavior of foreign-owned firms, like trading behavior in general, is beneficial. The technology being transferred from foreign firms to their US, affiliates, which the affiliate is importing, makes the affiliate more productive and, thus, more competitive. Similar statements can be made about other imported inputs. To the extent that trade allows the U.S. affiliate to make better use of its resources, the U.S, economy gains.
No matter how it is measured, foreign direct investment in the United States has increased substantially since the late 1970s, primarily via acquisitions. The current level of foreign ownership, however, is not high relative to that in most other developed countries. In addition, the foreign direct investment of US. firms still exceeds FDIUS, Overall, the rise in FDJUS can be viewed as the result of technological developments abroad that are being transferred to the United States. Other factors have also affected FDIUS, There is general agreement, for example, that the business cycle affects FDJUS and that, in some industries, the threat of protectionism or protectionism itself has influenced the investment decisions of foreign firms. Foreign exchange and tax rate changes have had, at most, slight effects, The transfers of technology are a positive development in that they reflect the expectation that production in the United States will be profitable. For the United States as a whole, this transfer of technology allows resources to be more productive, not only in the industry directly affected by the FDI, but also possibly in other industries because of external benefits, Critics have raised numerous concerns about whether foreign-owned firms in the United States behave differently than U.S. firms and whether this behavior might be detrimental to U.S. interests. These concerns do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. For instance, more technology is being transferred into the United States than out of the United States. The research and development activity of foreignowned firms is similar to that of U,S. firms. Compensation in foreign-owned firms is similar to U.S. firms, suggesting that foreign ownership is not replacing good jobs with bad ones. Finally, while foreign-owned firms tend to import more than they export, it is far from certain that this is detrimental to U.S. interests, Overall, foreign-owned companies are a positive factor in making the US. economy more competitive and productive. Advocates of public policies to deter foreign ownership should be viewed with skepticism.
